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Abstract 
Using a model of island economy where financial markets aggregate dispersed information of 
the public, we analyze how two-way communication between the central bank and the public 
affects inflation dynamics. When inflation target is observable and credible to the public, 
markets provide the bank with information about the aggregate state of the economy, and 
hence the bank can stabilize inflation. However, when inflation target is unobservable or less 
credible, the public updates their perceived inflation target and the information revealed from 
markets to the bank becomes less perfect. The degree of uncertainty facing the bank crucially 
depends on how two-way communication works.  
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The literature on monetary policy emphasizes that good communication from central bank
to the public as an important part of monetary policy in practice. Woodford (2005) argues
that managing expectations is crucial because effects of monetary policy depend not only on
the current policy stance but also on expectations of the future course of monetary policy.
There is vast literature emerged in this decade on central bank communication. Blinder et al.
(2008) survey this literature and conclude that communication can be important because it has
ability to move ﬁnancial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions
and potentially to help achieve central bank’s macroeconomic objectives.
Whileacademicliteraturehasfocusedoncentralbank’scommunicationtothepublicthrough
ﬁnancial markets, communication is not one-way. The bank is subject to a wide variety of un-
certainty, and one way to cope with it is to observe ﬁnancial markets. As Chairman of the
FRB (then Governor) Bernanke (2004b) explains, the bank can extract information about in-
ﬂation expectations and the economic fundamentals from ﬁnancial markets because markets
can aggregate a wide range of dispersed information. This direction of communication is less
emphasized in the academic literature on monetary policy, even though its importance is well
recognized in the central-banking community. Many central bankers, such as Dodge (2001)
(former Governor of the Bank of Canada), Fukui (2007) (former Governor of the Bank of
Japan), Macklem (2005) (Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada), Kohn (2008) (Vice Chair-
man of the FRB) emphasize that the communication between the central bank and the public is
two-way communication.
The objective of this paper is to analyze theoretically how the two-way communication
works between them and affects inﬂation dynamics. We consider a particular form of commu-
nication about monetary policy objectives: whether or not inﬂation target is made observable
to the public and credible.1 What we mean by communication from ﬁnancial markets to central
1AccordingtoBlinderetal.(2008), centralbankscommunicateaboutfourdifferentaspectsofmonetarypolicy:
policy objectives and strategy, the motives behind a particular policy decision; the economic outlook; and future
monetary policy decisions. In our model presented below the central bank announces its functional form of
monetary policy rule and economic assessment. Announcement of monetary policy rule is useful for agents to
understand monetary policy strategy and to predict future monetary policy decisions.
1bank is information revealed by asset prices. In order to analyze the above issue, we construct
a model of island economy in which information is dispersed. It is shown that the information
revealed from markets depends on whether or not the bank’s inﬂation target is observable to
the public and credible. In our model, when inﬂation target is observable to the public, the
degree of uncertainty facing the bank about aggregate state of the economy becomes smaller.
As a result, the central bank can stabilize inﬂation around its target value by responding to
the aggregate economic shocks. On the contrary, when inﬂation target is not observable to the
public —imperfect communication from central bank to the public—, we found that there are
two equilibria. One is the same as the equilibrium that would arise when the target is made
observable to the public. In the other equilibrium, information about the aggregate state of the
economy is revealed by less to the bank. This multiplicity of equilibria is different from the
multiplicity that would arise when monetary policy does not satisfy the Taylor Principle. The
multiplicity in our model results from the interaction between uncertainty facing the public
and uncertainty facing the bank. In the latter equilibrium inﬂation is persistence and volatile
through two channels. One channel is private agents’ uncertainty about inﬂation target. The
private-agent learning about the target creates inﬂation persistence, as is shown in Erceg and
Levin (2003). The other, which is our main focus, is the central bank’s uncertainty about the
aggregate economy. When equilibrium fails to reveal information about the aggregate state of
the economy, the bank fails to stabilize inﬂation. The bank’s learning process also adds in-
ﬂation persistence. Our analysis shows that the communication from ﬁnancial markets to the
central bank depends crucially on the communication from the bank to markets.
An intuition behind our result can be obtained from the following example. Consider an
economyinwhichthebankwishestokeeptrackofthenaturalinterestrate, whichistheequilib-
rium real interest rate under ﬂexible prices. By keeping track of the natural rate and controlling
the interest rate, the bank can offset the effects of changes in the natural rate on inﬂation. Sup-
pose now that the bank observes an increase in (long-term) nominal interest rates. There are
two possible reasons. One reason is that the private agents may have revised their inﬂation
expectations. The other reason is that the future natural interest rate may have increased. When
inﬂation target is observable to the public and is credible, then inﬂation expectations can be
2pinned down by the target. If the bank knows this fact, it could infer the natural interest rate
from nominal interest rates. However, when the inﬂation target is not observable to the public,
the bank cannot tell if the observed increase in the nominal rate is due to a revision in inﬂation
expectations or due to a change in the natural rate. Inaccurate information about the natural
rate makes the bank difﬁcult to offset the effects of the natural rate on inﬂation, and hence
destabilizes inﬂation. With this intuition, we show that under imperfect two-way communica-
tion the learning process of both the public and the central bank causes higher order beliefs
to become relevant, thus increasing the persistence and volatility of inﬂation. This mechanism
is capable of generating high persistence and volatility even though the underlying shocks are
purely transitory.
Our model is related to the literature on monetary policy under data uncertainty facing the
bank. For example, Orphanides (2001) emphasizes the importance of the measurement prob-
lem in monetary policy and inﬂation dynamics. This strand of literature regards the degree of
data uncertainty as exogenous and given to the bank. In this paper we show that the degree of
data uncertainty is endogenously determined by the communication problem. Improving com-
munication from the bank can make the measurement problem less serious. There is a growing
literature on the roles of higher order beliefs in monetary models. Woodford (2002) and Amato
and Shin (2003) consider higher order beliefs among ﬁrms under strategic complementarity
and how this setting generates persistent effect of monetary policy. Using a similar framework,
Lorenzoni (2008) shows that the bank can affect the way agents respond to their dispersed in-
formation by choosing its monetary policy rule appropriately.2 Compared with those papers,
we abstract from strategic complementarity among ﬁrms and focus on the interaction of beliefs
between private agents and the central bank. We analyze how the bank’s communication can
affect information revealed to the bank in equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section layouts the model. Section 3
and 4 derive equilibrium, and Section 5 analyzes inﬂation dynamics under imperfect two-way
communication and draws policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2See, also, Angeletos and Pavan (2008). In the earlier literature, King (1982) show that in the framework of
Lucas (1972) monetary policy can change the information content of prices and thus affect real allocation.
32 Model
The model is based on Aoki (2006), which is an island model with stochastic endowment under
ﬂexible prices. The assumption of endowment economy means that there is no real effects
of monetary policy. However, this framework allows us to analyze in a tractable way how
information revelation depends on monetary policy. The economy consists of continuum of
islands with mass 1. In each island there is mass 1 of Lucas trees that produce island-speciﬁc
goods. Stochastic ﬂuctuations in production represent supply shock. Agents in each island
visits a discrete number n of islands and consume goods and hold the claims to trees in those
islands. They do not observe the variables of the islands they do not visit. This assumption
captures the idea that information is dispersed across agents. There are two kinds of ﬁnancial
assets in the economy: claims to the trees and risk-free nominal bonds. There is central bank
which sets the nominal interest rate on the risk-free bonds. The model can be interpreted as
an island-economy version of the model of price-level determination in Chapter 2 of Woodford
(2003).
2.1 Structural equations
Each island is indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. In each island, there are measure 1 of agents and Lucas
trees. The trees in island i produce goods i, and production at time t per unit of tree is denoted
by Yt(i). All agents in island i are assumed to be identical, and in what follows we call those
agents “agent i”. Agent i consumes his consumption basket that contains a discrete number n
kinds of goods. Its consumption basket is denoted by Ji. It is assumed that Ji is constant over
time.







t, 0 < β < 1, (1)
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t is the expectation operator conditional on the information set of agent i at time t.
We will deﬁne the information set in detail in Section 2.2. Agent i holds trees of island j ∈ Ji


















where Pt(j) is the price of good j, Qt(j) is the price of tree j, Bi
t is the holdings of the nominal
bonds of agent i at the beginning of period t, Rt is the risk-free nominal interest rate between
timet andt+1, andSi
t(j)istheholdingsoftree j ofagentiatthebeginningoftimet. Pt(j)Yt(j)
represents nominal dividend per unit of tree j. Ownership of a tree at the beginning of time
t entitles the owner to receive the dividend in period t and to have the right to sell the tree at
price Qt in period t. Wi
t represents the total wealth of agent i at time t. At time 0, it is assumed
that agent i is endowed with one unit of tree i, that is, Si
0(i) = 1 and Si
0(j) = 0,i 6= j.
Agent i maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3). As is well known, the optimal consumption













Because of Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation (2), the expenditure share of each good is equal to 1/n.

















3For simplicity of notation, we assume that the consumption basket and portfolio of assets are both equal to Ji.

















∀j ∈ Ji. (7)






Now we characterize equilibrium. Assume for symmetry that each island respectively re-
ceives customers from n islands. Let Ii be the set of islands whose agents consume good i and
hold tree i. Since there is a ﬁxed supply 1 of Lucas trees in each island and nominal bond is










tdi = 0. (10)
Next, we construct the market clearing condition for each good. The total demand for good



















t} are determined in order to satisfy the market clear-
ing conditions ((9), (10) and (11)) and the optimality conditions ((4), (6) and (7)), given the
sequence of nominal interest rate that is speciﬁed by the Central Bank. Appendix A shows that







4See, for example, Sargent (1987), Chapter 3.





Equations (12) and (13) imply that Qt(i) = Qt(j) for any i, j. Equation (12) stems from the
assumption of the Cobb-Douglas preference (2). Equation (13) is an implication of log utility.5
Because(12)impliesthatthenominaldividendsofallthreesareidentical, theportfoliodecision
regarding the claims to trees is indeterminate as long as it satisﬁes the market clearing condition
(9). In equilibrium, the optimal holding of the nominal bond is given by Bi
t = 0 for all agents.
Therefore, (3), (12) and (9) imply that
Pi
tCi
t = Pt(i)Yt(i). (14)







Rt = 1. (15)
Equation (15) represents the expectational IS equation for island i. By substituting (13), one
obtains
Ei
tβ(Qt+1/Qt)Rt = 1, ∀i. (16)
In the next section we log-linearize the model around the steady state, and specify monetary
policy.
2.2 Log-linearized model and monetary policy
We log-linearize the model around the steady state in which Yt(i) = Y and Pt(i) is constant
for all t and all i. Then equation (15) implies that R = β−1. Deﬁne rt ≡ log(Rt/R), yt(i) ≡
log(Yt(i)/Y), qt ≡ logQt, pt(i) ≡ logPt(i), πt(i) ≡ pt(i)− pt−1(i). The log-linear approxima-
5See, for example, Sargent (1987), Chapter 3.


















represents the natural interest rate for island i.6 From (13), one obtains
∆qt = πt(i)+∆yt(i), ∀i, (19)
where ∆qt ≡ log(Qt/Qt−1). Therefore, the Euler equation can be written as
rt = Ei
t∆qt+1, ∀i. (20)
Next we consider how island-speciﬁc variables are related to aggregate variables. We as-
sume that output in each island consists of aggregate and idiosyncratic components:
yt(i) = yt +εt(i). (21)
Term εt(i) represents idiosyncratic supply shock in island i. Furthermore we assume that those
are i.i.d. with zero mean across islands and across time, so that
R 1











where yt, pt and πt respectively represent aggregate output, price level and inﬂation.
Finally let us discuss monetary policy. The bank wishes to stabilize aggregate inﬂation
around its inﬂation target. However, the aggregate state of the economy, including true aggre-
gate inﬂation πt, is not directly observable to the central bank. The underlying assumption is
6See Woodford (2003) for this concept.
8that it can visit only a subset of islands to collect data. It chooses the nominal interest rate by
following the simple monetary policy rule:
rt = φ(Ec
t πt − ¯ πt)+ ¯ πt +Ec
t ¯ rt, φ > 1, (22)
where Ec
t is the expectation operator conditional on the bank’s information set at time t, and ¯ πt
is the inﬂation target at time t, and
Ec
t ¯ rt ≡ Ec
t ∆yt+1 (23)
represents the bank’s estimate of aggregate natural interest rate. The information set of the
bank is speciﬁed in Section 2.3. Equation (22) assumes that the bank reacts to the deviation
of its best estimate of aggregate inﬂation from the target. Equation (22) also assumes that the
bank tries to keep track of the path of the natural interest rate ¯ rt. We interpret this term as
representing the bank’s stabilization policy. As is shown in Section 3, it can offset the effects of
the changes in ¯ rt on inﬂation by keeping track of ¯ rt. Finally, by assuming φ > 1, the monetary
policy rule (22) satisﬁes the so-called Taylor principle. Following Erceg and Levin (2003), we
assume that the inﬂation target consists of the long-run component (¯ π), and the transitory shock
(et):
¯ πt = ¯ π +et, (24)
where et is i.i.d. with mean zero. Notice that the monetary policy rule (22) can be written as
rt = φ(Ec
t πt − ¯ π)+ ¯ π +Ec
t ¯ rt +ut, (25)
where ut ≡ (1−φ)et can be interpreted as monetary policy shock in the empirical literature on
policy rules.
92.3 Information structure
Now let us describe the information structure. We assume that the structure of the economy
and parameter values are known to all agents and the central bank, and that this fact is common
knowledge. However different agents have different and imperfect information about the state
of the economy.
Firstly, let us deﬁne the information set of the central bank. The bank knows inﬂation target
(¯ π and et), and it observes the interest rate rt and asset price qt. It also collects data from a
subset of islands. Let Jc be the set of islands the central bank visits, which contains a discrete
number m of islands. The bank observes output yt(i), inﬂation πt(i) in island i in Jc. Those
are used to construct the bank’s noisy aggregate data. For example, the noisy measure of the







Superscript ‘o’ stands for ‘observable’. From equations (21) and (26), we obtain
yo









represents the bank’s measurement error of the aggregate output. Similarly, we can deﬁne the







In reality Consumer Price Index (CPI) corresponds to πo
t . CPI is not necessarily equal to
the true inﬂation because CPI covers only a subset of goods. Equation (22) assumes that the
bank does not just respond to CPI but uses all available information to estimate the underlying
true aggregate inﬂation and reacts to it. In reality, Ec
t yt and Ec
t πt correspond to the bank’s
assessment of economic activity after taking account of other information such as information
from ﬁnancial markets. (If the bank had perfect information, then Ec
t πt = πt and it would
10stabilize the true aggregate inﬂation.) We are aware that some inﬂation targeting countries such
as the United Kingdom deﬁne their policy regime in terms of a particular price index. Rather,
our assumption is closer to countries such as Japan and the United States, where monetary
policy regime is not deﬁned in terms of a speciﬁc price index.
Secondly, let us deﬁne the information set of agent i. The island-speciﬁc variables are
inﬂation πt(i) and output yt(i). We assume that the agent i observes their own variables (πt(i),
yt(i)) and the prices (inﬂation) and quantities of goods they consume (πt(j), yt(j)) for j ∈
Ji). Without loss of generality, assume that i ∈ Ji. We assume that the agents cannot directly
distinguish aggregate and idiosyncratic part of shocks in each variable (21). Asset price qt
and the nominal interest rate rt are observable to the agents. We assume that the bank’s noisy
measures of output and prices (yo
t , πo) are made observable to the agents. Also, Ec
t πt which is
in the monetary policy rule is observable. More speciﬁcally, we assume that Ec
t pt and Ec
t pt−1
are released by the bank (note that Ec
t πt ≡ Ec
t (pt − pt−1)). The underlying assumption is that
the Bank publishes its best estimate of the aggregate inﬂation to which its policy reacts. Since
qt = pt +yt = Ec
t pt +Ec
t yt, Ec
t yt is also observable to the agents. Then (22) implies that ¯ πt also
becomes observable. However, following Erceg and Levin (2003), we assume that the private
agents cannot directly observe the underlying components of ¯ πt unless the bank announces it
explicitly and it becomes credible.
To summarize, the bank’s information set at time t, Ωc

















The bank’s expectations operator, Ec
t is conditional on Ωc
t.7 The information set of agent i, Ωi
t,
7One may wonder if the bank has survey measures of economic activities, such as survey measures of inﬂation
expectations. Whileitwouldbeinterestingtoextendouranalysistoincorporatesurveymeasures, weabstractfrom
those indicators and focus on how equilibrium prices and quantities traded in the markets reveal information. The
bank may also observe break even inﬂation rates that are derived from the nominal bonds and inﬂation-indexed
bonds. While such measure can be informative, Bernanke (2004b) argues that the bank should use it with caution
because of time-varying inﬂation risk premium and liquidity premium. See, for example, Sack (2000), Shen and
Corning (2001) and Sack and Elsasser (2004). A useful analysis that includes inﬂation-indexed bonds would have




















The expectation operator Ei
t is conditional on Ωi
t. In what follows, we assume the output and
monetary policy shock are i.i.d. normal and independent from each other. More speciﬁcally,
we assume
yt ∼ N(0,γ−1
y ), εt(i) ∼ N(0,γ−1
ε ), et ∼ N(0,γ−1
e ). (30)
Here γy, γε, γe are respectively precision of yt, εt and et.8 It is assumed that the distributions are
known and common knowledge. Under this assumption, (23) implies that the bank’s estimate
of the aggregate natural interest rate is
Ec
t ¯ rt = −Ec
t yt. (31)
This implies that Ec
t ¯ rt in equation (22) is also observable to private agents.
2.4 Inﬂation and expectations
In equilibrium, the endogenous variables {it,πt}∞
t=0 satisﬁes equations (15) and (22), and ex-
pectations of each of the bank and the private agents are rational. Although expectations are
determined endogenously in equilibrium, it is useful to see how inﬂation depends on the expec-
tations of the central bank and the private agents. For the subsequent analysis it is convenient
to rewrite (22). Since integration of (19) over i yields
∆qt = πt +∆yt, (32)
equation (22) can be written as
rt = φ∆qt +(1−φ)¯ πt −φEc
t ∆yt +Ec
t ∆yt+1. (33)
8Precision is deﬁned as the inverse of variance.





Equation (34) holds for any agent i. Solve this difference equation forward:9













˜ πt(i) ≡ Ei
t ¯ π
denotes the perceived inﬂation target of agent i. Then, by using (32), one can show that the
equilibrium inﬂation satisﬁes


















equation (36) is written as





















9In deriving equation (35) we use the fact that
Ec
t ∆yt+1 = −Ec
t yt = −Ei
tEc
t yt = Ei
tEc
t ∆yt+1.
Here the ﬁrst equality uses the assumption that yt is i.i.d. with zero mean, and the second equality uses the fact
that Ec
t yt is observable to agents.
13Equation (37) has the standard property that equilibrium inﬂation depends on expectations
about future monetary policy. This is one of the reasons why communication is considered
to be an important part of monetary policy, as is shown in Woodford (2005). In equation
(37) inﬂation depends on the agents’ expectations about the bank’s mismeasurement of the
economy. Note that πt −Ec
t πt = (Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt). Therefore the second line of equation (37)
represents the expected discounted sum of the bank’s current and future estimation error of
inﬂation. Similarly, noticing that Ec
t ¯ rt ≡ Ec
t ∆yt+1, the third line is the expected discounted
sum of the current and future estimation error of the aggregate natural interest rate. Intuitively
speaking, the bank’s information problem is the inability to decompose aggregate nominal
variable (qt) into quantity (yt) and prices (pt), and prices depend on agents’ perceived inﬂation
target. An imprecise estimate of perceived inﬂation target results in an imprecise estimate of
yt. In the subsequent Sections we analyze how information revealed by ﬁnancial markets may
help the bank do this decomposition.
3 Equilibrium with perfect two-way communication
In this section we analyze the rational expectations equilibrium when the bank’s inﬂation target
is made observable to the public and credible. In that case ¯ π and et are known and common
knowledge, implying ˜ πt(i) = ¯ π. In this case, it is shown that the rational expectations equilib-
rium is fully revealing.10 We can prove this by guess-and-verify. First, guess that yt is revealed
in equilibrium at all t. Then, equation (37) reduces to
πt = ¯ π +(1−φ−1)et. (38)
10The result that the equilibrium is fully revealing depends on the assumption that there is only one aggregate
shock that is not directly observable to the bank. If there are other kinds of unobservable shocks, such as aggregate
demand shock, then the equilibrium is not necessarily fully revealing. See Aoki (2006). However, the general
results discussed below would go through — namely, the degree of uncertainty facing the bank becomes smaller
under perfect two-way communication than under imperfect communication.
14Nowweverifyyt isrevealedbyassetpricewheninﬂationisgivenby(38). Since∆qt =πt+∆yt,
(38) implies
∆qt − ¯ π −(1−φ−1)et = ∆yt. (39)
Since the left hand side is observable to both the central bank and the public, ∆yt is indeed
revealed in equilibrium. This means that, given yt−1 is revealed in time t −1, yt is revealed in
time t. Therefore we have conﬁrmed that information is fully revealed to the bank even though
the bank cannot directly observe the aggregate state of the economy. In other words, when ¯ π is
made observable to the public and credible, ﬁnancial markets aggregate information on behalf
of the bank, and as a result, the bank is not subject to uncertainty regarding the measurement of
the natural rate. Thus, communication from markets to the central bank works perfectly when
the bank communicates its inﬂation target.
Equation (38) implies that inﬂation ﬂuctuation does not involve any persistence when et is
white noise. The other disturbance, ¯ rt, does not affect inﬂation ﬂuctuations because the bank
fully offsets its effects on inﬂation. In this sense, the bank’s stabilization policy works perfectly.
4 Equilibrium when long-run inﬂation target is not directly
observable to the public
In this section we analyze the case in which the bank’s long-run inﬂation target ¯ π is not credibly
observable to the public. It is shown that there are two equilibria: one in which information is
fully revealed and the other in which it is not. This multiplicity of equilibria is not the same
as indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria when monetary policy does not satisfy the
so-called Taylor principle. As is shown below, the multiplicity is due to the interaction between
uncertainty facing the bank and uncertainty facing the public.
4.1 Fully revealing equilibrium
Even if ¯ π is not directly observable to the public, equilibrium inﬂation (38) is still an equilib-
rium. To show this, suppose that inﬂation is given by (38). Then ∆qt is given by (39). Recall
15that ∆qt is observable to both the bank and agents. Similar to Section 3, the bank can infer ∆yt
by looking at (39). This implies Ec
t yt = yt, and Ec
t πt = πt. How about the agents? Since it is
assumed that the bank announces Ec
t πt and ∆qt = πt +∆yt, ∆yt is also revealed to the agents
when Ec
t πt = πt. Then equation (39) can be written as
∆qt −∆yt − ¯ πt = −φ−1et.
Since the left hand side is directly observable to the agents, they can identify et and hence they
can infer ¯ π by ¯ π = ¯ πt −et.
Therefore we have established that when equilibrium inﬂation is given by (38) then yt is
revealed to the bank and ¯ π is revealed to the agents. On the other hand, when the agents know
¯ π and the bank knows yt, it is straightforward to show that equilibrium inﬂation is given by
(38). Thus the fully revealing equilibrium is still an equilibrium even when ¯ π is not directly
observable to the public.
4.2 Equilibrium with imperfect two-way communication
While the equilibrium analyzed in Section 4.1 is an equilibrium, it is not the only equilibrium.
Here we construct an equilibrium in which the two-way communication does not work per-
fectly. Unlike the case of perfect two-way communication (equations (38) and (39)), equations
(35) and (36) imply that the bank may not be able to decompose ∆qt into πt and ∆yt when the
perceived inﬂation target is not directly observable. In other words, ﬁnancial markets may not
provide accurate information about yt when ¯ π is not directly observable to the agents. Simi-
larly, agents may not be able to infer ¯ π by observing qt, and therefore they have to estimate it.
Assume that agent i has the following prior distribution about the target






where ˜ π−1 is agent i’s initial prior about ¯ π, and τ
p
−1 is the initial precision. Here we consider
the simplest case in which the initial prior and precision are identical to all agents, and assume
16that it is common knowledge.11 Under this assumption, there is an equilibrium in which: ¯ π
is not revealed immediately to the agents; and both yt and perceived inﬂation target are not
revealed immediately to the central bank. Here we report our main results and the details of the
derivation are given in Appendix B.
Since ∆qt is observable to the bank (i.e., Ec
t ∆qt = ∆qt), a useful expression can be obtained
by taking Ec
t of equation (35):
∆qt = (1−φ−1)¯ πt +φ−1Ec
t ˜ πt(i)+Ec
t ∆yt. (41)










t ∆yt+s+1, ∀s ≥ 0. (43)
In Appendix B.3, we prove that equation (42) and (43) indeed hold under information revealed
in equilibrium. By substituting (32) into (41), one obtains
πt = ¯ π +(1−φ−1)et +φ−1(Ec
t ˜ πt(i)− ¯ π)+(Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt). (44)
Equation (44) shows that πt depends on the second-order belief, namely, the bank’s belief about
agent i’s perceived inﬂation target ˜ πt(i).
Firstly, let us derive the evolution of the agents’ belief. In each period, the agents update
their perceived long-run inﬂation target ¯ π. Since monetary policy rule (22) implies that the
agents can identify ¯ πt, their observation equation is given by equation (24). Under assumption
11This may be a strong assumption because in reality different agents may have different perceived inﬂation
target. However, since the agents have the same observation equation (24) in our model, their learning process
from time 0 on is identical, and their perceived inﬂation target will converge with each other even if they start with
different initial priors. As is shown below, by assuming that the initial prior is the same across agents the dynamic
path of the perceived inﬂation target becomes identical from time 0 on. Modelling heterogeneity in perceived
inﬂation target is left for future research.
17(30), the distribution of ¯ πt is given by






The ﬁltering problem of the agents is to distinguish the transitory component et from the con-
stant term ¯ π. This is a classic inference problem from a normal distribution with unknown
mean and known variance. Then the posterior mean after t observations is given by (see DeG-
root (1970))



















Since ¯ πt = ¯ π +et, (46) can be expressed as










Notice that at → 0 as t → ∞. Also, 1
t+1 ∑
t
s=1es → 0 by the law of large numbers. Therefore, as
the agents observe more information over time, they will eventually learn ¯ π. Alternatively, we
can write (47) in a recursive form:















Equation (48) gives the evolution of the perceived inﬂation target.
Secondly, we consider the central bank. While equilibrium is given by both (20) and (22),
all the variables in (22) are conditional on the bank’s information set. Therefore, we take the
18Euler equation (20) as the bank’s observation equation. The bank’s ﬁltering problem is to es-
timate the perceived inﬂation target ˜ πt and aggregate output yt. Notice that the right hand side
of (20), Ei
t∆qt+1, is determined endogenously in equilibrium as a function of ˜ πt, yt, and the
bank’s estimate of the economy. Equilibrium depends on the bank’s policy and the bank’s pol-
icy depends on its estimate of the state of the economy, and the bank’s estimate in turn depends
on the statistical relationship between the bank’s observables and unobservable variables in
equilibrium. Therefore it is necessary to solve the ﬁltering problem and equilibrium simulta-
neously.12 We solve the equilibrium and ﬁltering by the method of undetermined coefﬁcients.
In Appendix B.2, it is shown that the evolution of the bank’s estimation error of the perceived
inﬂation target ˜ πt is given by
Ec
t ˜ πt − ˜ πt = dtbt
 
Ec







where Bt and dt are time-varying deterministic parameters deﬁned in Appendix. The reason
why Bt and dt are time-varying is because the agents’ learning about inﬂation target is transitory
and the bank knows this fact. The evolution of the bank’s estimation error of the aggregate
output is given by
Ec









There is a close relationship between those estimates. Indeed, Appendix B.2 shows that the
relationship is given by
Ec




t yt −yt). (51)
Equation (51) implies that imprecise estimate of the perceived inﬂation target results in impre-
cise estimate of aggregate output.
12See, Aoki (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003) for optimal ﬁltering in forward looking models.
195 Inﬂation dynamics under imperfect two-way communica-
tion
5.1 Inﬂation dynamics
Now we are able to complete our analysis of inﬂation dynamics under impoerfect two-way
communication. Using (44) and (51), equilibrium inﬂation can be written as
πt = ¯ π +(1−φ−1)et +φ−1(˜ πt − ¯ π)+φ−1(Ec
t ˜ πt − ˜ πt)+(Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt) (52)





where ˜ πt − ¯ π and yt −Ec
t yt respectively evolve according to (48) and (50), and Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt
evolves according to equation (B.36) that is shown in Appendix B. The ﬁrst two terms (¯ π +
(1−φ−1)et) of equation (52) are identical to (38), that is, the equilibrium inﬂation when the
inﬂation target is observable and credible. The third term φ−1(˜ πt − ¯ π) represents ﬂuctuations
that are caused by agents’ uncertainty about the inﬂation target which affects their inﬂation
expectations. The fourth term φ−1at/Bt (yt −Ec
t yt) represents ﬂuctuations caused by the bank’s
mismeasurement of the natural rate. Since we assume that output is i.i.d., the natural rate is
given by
Ec
t ¯ rt = Ec
t ∆yt+1 = −Ec
t yt.
The last term of equation (52), (Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt), represents the ﬂuctuations caused by the bank’s
mismeasurement of aggregate inﬂation that it reacts to. Note that πt = ∆qt −∆yt Therefore the
mismeasurement of ∆yt results in mismeasurement of πt. Equation (48) implies that ˜ πt− ¯ π →0
as t → ∞, therefore the agents will eventually learn about ¯ π. This in turn implies that the
bank’s uncertainty about perceived inﬂation target also diminishes over time. Therefore, πt →
¯ π +(1−φ−1)et as t → ∞.
In order to investigate the properties of inﬂation under imperfect two-way communica-
tion, we conduct a simple stochastic simulation of our model. We generate artiﬁcial normally-
distributed shocks and obtain the stochastic process of inﬂation under the learning process of
20the agents and the central bank. Each simulation generates inﬂation dynamics of 50 periods.13
Then, for each simulation we compute the ﬁrst order autocorrelation and standard deviation of
inﬂation. In order to examine how the stochastic properties of inﬂation are affected by learning,
the statistics are estimated over the ﬁrst 25 periods and the second 25 periods separately. The
above process is repeated 1000 times, and the statistics are averaged over 1000 sets. Our data
frequency should be interpreted as annual rather than quarterly, since our model is a ﬂexible
price model.
In the simulation, several parameters must be speciﬁed. What we have in mind in the
analysis is the disinﬂation process that occurred in the 1980’s in several developed countries
such as the US. We choose the central bank’s long-run inﬂation target, ¯ π, of 2%, and the
agent’s prior in (40), ˜ π−1, of 10%. According to the analysis of Kozicki and Tinsley (2001,
2005), these values are roughly in line with the US economy at the beginning of 1980s. We
set Ec
−1 ˜ π−1 = 12%, which means that the bank overestimated the initial perceived target by 2
percentage points.14 The volatility of et is taken from empirical volatility of monetary policy
shock. (See equation (25)). The standard deviation of monetary policy shock is set to 1%.
According to Roberts (2004), this is in line with the FED policy between 1960 and 1983. This
implies that the standard deviation of et is (φ −1)−1, which in turn implies that γe = (1−φ)2.
Thestandarddeviationofmeasurementerror, εo
t , iscitedfromOrphanides(2001). Wecalculate
the standard deviation of the cumulative revisions of the output measures from his estimates.
The resulting standard deviation is 0.89, implying γεo =1.26.15 The policy coefﬁcient, φ, is set




We also examine robustness against changing the parameter values.
Since our model is highly stylized, the simulation exercise should not be interpreted as
trying to match the data. In particular, we have assumed for tractability that all the structural
shocks are white noise processes. Therefore, the persistence reported below are purely driven
13More precisely, we simulate the economy for 55 periods and discard the ﬁrst 5 periods to remove the effects
of the initial values of shocks (all the shocks at t = −1 are set equal to zero).
14This range is within the difference in the estimate of perceived target between Bekaert et al. (2006) and
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).
15This may underestimate the degree of uncertainty facing the bank because it implicitly assumes that the ﬁnal
output data corresponds to true output.
21bylearningbycentralbankandagents. Inreality, shockscanbepersistentprocess. Thisimplies
that the persistence reported below may be interpreted as the lower bound that our theoretical
model can generate.
Table 1. Time-varying persistence and volatility of inﬂation under imperfect
two-way communication
A B C D E F G H
¯ π 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
˜ π−1 10 20 10 10 10 10 10 10
γu 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
γεo 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 0.32 1.26 1.26 1.26
φ 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τ
p
−1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1
τc
−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1
Ec
−1 ˜ π−1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 14
ρ1(πt) 0.30 0.67 0.48 0.21 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.36
ρ2(πt) -0.020 0.030 0.026 -0.028 -0.020 0.08 -0.021 -0.012
σ1(πt) 0.89 1.36 1.20 0.42 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.94
σ2(πt) 0.68 0.70 0.82 0.34 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.69
Note: Inﬂation levels and standard deviations are measured in percentage points (for example,
¯ π = 2 means inﬂation target of 2%). ρ1(πt) and ρ2(πt) respectively denote the ﬁrst-order serial
correlation of inﬂation in the ﬁrst and second subperiod. σ1(πt) and σ2(πt) denote the standard
deviation in the ﬁrst and second subperiod. Cases A-H are explained below.
Case A: benchmark.
Case B: higher perceived target. Initial perceived inﬂation target is set to 20%. This may cor-
respond to the case of the introduction of inﬂation targeting in some emerging countries.
When Chile, Israel and Hungary adopted inﬂation targeting, the inﬂation rates were about
20%.
Case C: less aggressive monetary policy. φ issetto1.3, whichislowerthantheoriginalTaylor
rule.
Case D: smaller monetary policy shock. The standard deviation of monetary policy shock is
set to 0.5% and hence γu=4. According to Roberts (2004), this is almost in line with the
Fed policy after 1984.
Case E: large measurement error. The standard deviation of measurement error is twice
larger: γεo = 1.26/4
Case F: stubborn agent’s belief. The initial value of the agent’s precision parameter, τ
p
−1, is 10,
which means that the public is more convinced by their own belief.
Case G: stubborn central-bank belief. The initial value of the central-bank precision parame-
ter, τc
−1, is 10.
Case H: imprecise bank’s estimate of perceived target. Bank’s initial estimate of ˜ π−1 is in-
creased to 14.
Table 1 shows the simulation results. The benchmark case is Case A. First-order autocorre-
lation and standard deviation of inﬂation become smaller in the second half period than the ﬁrst
half period. In the ﬁrst half, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is about 0.3, implying that inﬂation
22can be persistent even if all the shocks are purely transitory. The standard deviation is also high
(0.89). On the contrary, both inﬂation persistence and the volatility of inﬂation decline in the
second half period. Inﬂation is almost white noise and its standard deviation drops below 0.68.
This is because the agents and central bank eventually learn about the inﬂation target and the
perceived inﬂation target respectively. Cases B-H examine robustness. In all these cases, the
persistence and volatility of inﬂation are higher in the ﬁrst subperiod than the second. There-
fore the result that learning by central bank and agents add persistence and volatility is robust to
variations in parameter values. Case B shows that, compared with Case A, a higher initial per-
ceived target results in larger persistence and volatility in the ﬁrst subperiod. Case C shows that
a weaker monetary policy response to inﬂation can make inﬂation more persistent and volatile.
This is consistent with the previous literature that ﬁnds that inﬂation was more volatile and per-
sistent in the 1970s in the US when the Fed’s response to inﬂation was weaker.16 Case D shows
that smaller monetary policy shock results in lower persistence and volatility. This is because
agents’ learning becomes easier. Also smaller monetary policy shock decreases directly inﬂa-
tion volatility. Case E shows that larger measurement error results in higher persistence and
volatility. This is because central bank’s learning about output becomes more difﬁcult. In Case
F, the agents are more convinced about their initial perceived target.17 In this case, the agents
would put less weight on new information when they update their perceived target. As a result,
inﬂation becomes more persistent and volatile. Cases G and H examine the effects of the bank’s
uncertainty on inﬂation dynamics. In Case G, the bank’s initial precision is high, implying that
the bank is more convinced of its initial prior about perceived target. Similar to Case F, this
results in higher persistence and volatility in the ﬁrst subperiod. Finally, in Case H, the bank’s
initial estimate of the perceived inﬂation target is further away from the perceived target. This
results in higher persistence and volatility than the benchmark case in the ﬁrst subperiod.
16Clarida et al. (2000) shows that a smaller monetary policy response to inﬂation can result in indeterminacy of
rational expectations equilibrium, resulting in high inﬂation volatility. Benati (2008) ﬁnds that inﬂation is more
persistent in the 70s than 90s.
17This case can be interpreted as the situation in which the bank’s announcement of the target is less credible.
235.2 Communication and measurement of economic activity
Under imperfect communication, inﬂation is persistent and volatile in the early phase of learn-
ing. Equation (48) shows that monetary policy shock et has persistent effects on the perceived
target. ThisagreeswithErcegandLevin(2003), whoconsideraneconomyinwhichtheagents’
learning about inﬂation target can make inﬂation process persistent.18 In our model, there is
another channel. The bank’s uncertainty about perceived inﬂation target causes mismeasure-
ment of the natural rate and aggregate inﬂation, and this fact de-stabilizes inﬂation (equation
(37)). Equation (49) shows that the bank’s learning can a persistent process, adding persistence
to inﬂation.
Our model shows that the two-way communication between the public and the bank is com-
plementary. When the bank fails to communicate its inﬂation target, ﬁnancial markets fail to
reveal information about the aggregate state of the economy to the bank. The literature on mon-
etary policy under data uncertainty assumes that the degree of uncertainty facing the bank is
exogenously given.19 In this paper we show that the degree of uncertainty is endogenously de-
termined by the communication problem. Improving communication from the bank can make
the measurement problem less serious. This has important policy implications. If we take the
measurement problem as exogenously given, a policy prescription may be not to respond ac-
tively to those economic variables subject to measurement errors. For example, Orphanides
and Williams (2005) argue that it is desirable for monetary policy not to respond actively to the
unemployment gap because it can be subject to large measurement errors. Orphanides (2003b)
argues that a version of nominal income targeting performs well under uncertainty because it
is less sensitive to measurement errors.20 On the other hand, our model implies that imper-
18Erceg and Levin (2003) assume that the central bank has perfect information, which in our model corresponds
to the case of Ec
t ˜ πt = ˜ πt.
19For example, Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003a) show that the mismeasurement of economic activity, such as
the output gap and natural unemployment rate, was responsible for the ‘Great Inﬂation’ of the 1970s-1980s in the
United States.
20In our model, if the monetary policy rule (22) is replaced by
rt = φ(πo
t − ¯ πt)+ ¯ πt +Ec
t ¯ rt,
then the bank reacts directly to the measurement error of inﬂation. Therefore this rule may destabilize inﬂation
through its response to measurement error, as is argued by Orphanides and Williams (2005). Nominal income
targeting can avoid responding to measurement errors in our model because nominal income (qt) is directly ob-
24fect communication can endogenously amplify the measurement problem and that improving
communication and gaining credibility help the bank reduce the measurement problem.
5.3 Learning and time-varying stochastic process of inﬂation
Our model shows that the persistence and volatility of inﬂation decline as both of the agents and
central bank learn. It is interesting to compare this observation with some empirical studies.
Benati (2008) found that under inﬂation targeting inﬂation persistence declined signiﬁcantly
and exhibits almost no persistence in UK, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, while it was
highly persistent between the breakdown of Bretton Woods and the introduction of inﬂation
targeting. In Benati (2004), he found that the volatility of GDP and inﬂation in the UK has
decreased since the introduction of inﬂation targeting in 1992. Our model can offer an explana-
tion of his ﬁndings. As inﬂation targeting becomes credible, the agents’ uncertainty about the
long-run inﬂation rate has decreased over time. A decrease in the agents’ uncertainty has re-
duced the uncertainty facing the bank. As a result, the bank’s stabilization policy has improved,
making inﬂation process less volatile and less persistent.
Also, several articles have documented that macroeconomic volatility in several OECD
countries have declined over the past twenty years — the so called ‘Great Moderation.’ See,
for example, Ahmed et al. (2004), Stock and Watson (2003), Cogley and Sargent (2005). Our
model, even though it is stylized, has an interesting implication for the econometric analysis
of the Great Moderation. In the literature, two competing explanations for the Great Modera-
tion are considered very likely. One is “good policy”, i.e. improvements in monetary policy.
The other is “good luck”, i.e. a fortuitous reduction in exogenous shocks. Several prominent
studies have provided support for the good-luck hypothesis. However, Bernanke (2004a) and
Benati and Surico (2008) argue that the existing studies may incorrectly identify the effect of
good policy as good luck. Econometricians typically do not measure exogenous shocks di-
rectly but instead infer them from movements in macroeconomic variables that they cannot
otherwise explain. When the central bank’s inﬂation target is not made observable to the pub-
servable. However, in order to respond to the natural interest rate the bank still needs to estimate yt.
25lic, the change in de-anchored inﬂation expectation may result in what appear to be change in
exogenous shocks. Shocks in this sense may certainly depend on monetary policy regime. Ac-
cordingly, as the inﬂation expectation becomes to be anchored gradually, the standard deviation
of innovation in the reduced form regression may become smaller even when the magnitude of
exogenous shock is constant. This makes an econometric analysis based on reduced-form re-
gression incorrectly lead to good-luck bias. Their argument is closely related to the prediction
of our model. In our model, the volatility and persistence of inﬂation changes over time as the
bank and agents learn, even though the monetary policy rule (22) and variances of shocks (σe,
σy) are kept constant. The communication problem creates ﬂuctuations in inﬂation expecta-
tions through the agents’ learning. This diminishes over time as the agents learn. In addition
to this, this problem creates additional uncertainty facing the bank, which makes policy erratic.
This also contributes to variances that diminish over time.
6 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that the two-way communication between the central bank
andthepubliciscomplementary. Wereachedthisconclusionbyconsideringanislandeconomy
in which the degree of information aggregation by markets is an equilibrium outcome. While
the previous literature on communication has focused on the effects of central-bank commu-
nication on expectations of the public, we showed that the degree of the bank’s uncertainty
regarding the aggregate state of the economy can crucially depend on its communication strat-
egy. Our model implies that, by communicating well with markets, the bank can reduce its
measurement problem. When the communication is not well functioning, the model predicts
that inﬂation can be persistent and volatile even when there is no intrinsic persistence and struc-
tural shocks are white noise. Central bankers often regard ﬁnancial markets as the mirror that
reﬂects macroeconomic activities. The mirror can get clouded if the bank’s communication is
imperfect.
There is a number of directions to future research. Firstly, it is important to introduce a
source of the real effects of monetary policy, such as price stickiness or information stickiness,
26to analyze the implications of both inﬂation and output. Secondly, in reality there are may
other ways of central bank communication other than announcing inﬂation target. Some central
banks publish their forecasts of the future path of inﬂation and/or policy rates. In our stylized
current setting, it is straightforward to show that, if those forecasts are credible, announcing the
predictions and making the inﬂation target credible are equivalent. This prediction might be
too extreme compared with reality. As Dale et al. (2008) argues, a fruitful analysis of what to
communicate (communication strategy) would need to consider imperfections in agents’ ability
to interpret the bank’s announcement. Thirdly, it would be interesting to model heterogeneity
in perceived inﬂation target. In our model, since the agents have the same observation equation,
their perceived inﬂation target is identical. This assumption signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed the analysis
because in the current model the agents do not need to infer the perceived inﬂation target of the
others. If we allow heterogeneity, we conjecture that the information would be even less likely
to reveal than our current analysis because there would be one more layer of ﬁltering. Fourthly,
it would be interesting to analyze the model’s implications for the yield curve.21 Finally, it
would be interesting to examine some other monetary policy regimes with stronger nominal
anchor. In the present paper, it is assumed that the bank changes the nominal interest rate in
response to deviations of inﬂation from its target value. It would be interesting to analyze price
level targeting in the context of interest-rate rules, or monetary-aggregate control instead of
interest-rate control. Recently, the Bank of Canada is investigating the potential beneﬁts of
price level targeting. It would be important to analyze how different policy regimes perform
under different degree of communication.
21Gurkaynak et al. (2005) shows that long-term nominal interest rates tend to be sensitive to changes in current
monetary policy actions when there is uncertainty about nominal anchor. This is because current monetary policy
actions bring some news about long-run inﬂation target.
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A Equilibrium conditions in Section 2.1
Here we show the equilibrium conditions of the model presented in Section 2.1. Suppose agent
i maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3) and the initial condition Si
0(i) = 1. Then, the following
conditions must hold in equilibrium:
(a) the relative price of two goods i, j is given by (12) and asset prices are all equal;
(b) for all agents i, the optimal holdings of nominal bond is Bi
t = 0;
(c) for all agents i, the optimal portfolio of trees is indeterminate but satisﬁes (9);
(d) the price of tree j is given by (13);
(e) consumption function of agent i is given by (8).
What we need to show is that (a)-(e) satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (4)-(7), budget con-
straint (3) and the market equilibrium conditions (9)-(11). Under (a)-(c), we can express the








Under (a)-(c) and the initial condition Si




t = Pt(i)Yt(i). (A.2)





which is equation (13).
28Now we show that (a)-(e) satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions and the market clearing condi-




tdi = 0. When Qt(i) = Qt(j) for all i, j, all trees become perfect substitutes, so Si
t(j)
becomes indeterminate as long as it satisﬁes ∑j∈JiSi
t(j) = 1.22 It is possible to construct Si
t(j)
such that ∑j∈JiSi
t(j) = 1 and the market clearing condition ∑j∈IiS
j
t(i) = 1. One such example
is Si
t(j) = 1/n for all i, j. This clearly satisﬁes (9).
Next we consider the goods-market clearing. The market clearing condition for good i is
















Now it is clear that (a) satisﬁes (A.4).
Finally, we need to show that (A.1) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (7). Since Qt(i) =
















is satisﬁed. Under (A.1) and the portfolio decisions (b) and (c), Pi
t+1Ci












t+1 is given by (A.6) it is easily shown that the ﬁrst order condition (A.5) is satis-
ﬁed.
22Later, we will show that the consumption function with ∑j∈Ji Si
t(j) = 1 and Bi
t = 0 satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition.
29Now we have veriﬁed that (a)-(e) are all consistent with the ﬁrst order conditions and the
market clearing conditions. Lastly, the aggregate price level is determined to satisfy the other
ﬁrst order condition (6), which is analyzed in the main text.
B Bank’s ﬁltering and equilibrium in Section 4.2
B.1 Constructing the observation equation of the bank
Key equations for the bank’s ﬁltering is (20) and (41). In addition to those, the bank has noisy
measures of aggregate state of the economy (27).23 Equations (20) and (41) imply24
rt = Ei
t∆qt+1





In order to solve the bank’s ﬁltering problem, it is convenient to rewrite (B.7) in terms of ˜ π−1.
By taking conditional expectation Ec
t of equation (47) and subtracting the resulting equation
from (47), we have
Ec
t ˜ πt − ˜ πt = at (Ec








t+1 ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1

. (B.9)
Here we use the fact that Ei
t ˜ πt+1 = ˜ πt. Equation (B.8) shows that what matters to the bank’s
estimation error of the perceived inﬂation target is its estimation error of the initial perceived
target. Substituting (B.9) into (B.7), one obtains









23We also have (29) as noisy inﬂation measure, but it is redundant once we have (27) since qt = yt + pt.
24Recall that ˜ πt(i) = ˜ πt for all i because of assumption (40).
30Substituting (46) into the above equation, and collecting the variables that are observable to the
























Note that Xt is directly observable both to the central bank and agents. Then equation (B.10)










Equation (B.12) involves the agents’ expectations about the bank’s future estimate of ˜ π−1. It
comes from the second term in equation (B.7), which in turn comes from agents’ expecta-
tions about the future monetary policy. The agents’ expectations about future monetary policy
depends on their expectations about the bank’s ﬁltering in the subsequent periods.
To summarize, the bank’s observation equations are (B.12) and (27). Now the remain-
ing task is to compute the equilibrium and the bank’s ﬁltering. Equation (B.12) still contains
endogenous variables, namely, rt, Ei
tEc
t+1 ˜ π−1 and Ei
tEc
t+1∆yt+1. Those terms should be deter-
mined jointly with the bank’s ﬁltering. In the next section, we will compute the equilibrium
and the ﬁltering by the method of undetermined coefﬁcients.
B.2 Deriving the equilibrium and the bank’s ﬁltering
Notice that the economy can be represented by Xt, yt, yo
t , ˜ π−1, and Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1. Noisy output
measure yo
t affects the bank’s policy through ﬁltering, and policy in turn affects equilibrium
inﬂation. Past estimate of the initial perceived target, Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1, affects equilibrium at time t
through bank’s ﬁltering. Finally, we include ˜ π−1, not ˜ πt, because equation (47) shows that the
bank’s uncertainty about ˜ πt is due to its uncertainty about ˜ π−1. Therefore, we guess that in
31equilibrium equation (B.12) takes the following form:
AtXt = −yt +Bt ˜ π−1+CtEc
t−1 ˜ π−1+Dtyo
t , (B.13)
where At, Bt, Ct, Dt are time-varying coefﬁcients to be determined. The coefﬁcient on yt is
normalized to one. While Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1 and yo
t are directly observable to the bank, yt and ˜ π−1 are
not. Equation (B.13) shows that the bank cannot identify yt and ˜ π−1 separately.
Now the bank’s observation equations are equations (27) and (B.13). By substituting (27)
into (B.13) to eliminate yt, and moving all the variables that are observable to the bank to the




t +Bt ˜ π−1. (B.14)
Equation (B.14) shows that the bank’s ﬁltering problem reduces to the sequential updating of
a constant, ˜ π−1. A slight complication is that it involves a time-varying coefﬁcient Bt. Deﬁne
the new observable variable by
Vt ≡ AtXt −CtEc
t−1 ˜ π−1+(1−Dt)yo
t .
From (27) and (28), we obtain
εo
t ∼ N(0,γ−1
ε0 ), γεo ≡ m2γε. (B.15)
From equations (B.14) and (B.15)Vt is normally distributed
Vt ∼ N





Let the prior distribution at time t be
Bt−1 ˜ π−1 ∼ N
 
Bt−1Ec




t−1 is the bank’s precision at the end of time t −1 (i.e., before the bank observes time-t
variables). Then the prior for Bt ˜ π−1 is given by












The posterior mean of Bt ˜ π−1 is given by (see DeGroot (1970))
BtEc
t ˜ π−1 = dtBtEc
















The law of motion of τc









Using the deﬁnition of Vt, one can rewrite (B.17) as
Ec















Equation (B.20) gives the bank’s estimate of the initial perceived target. How about the bank’s
estimate of output? Notice that (B.13) implies
Ec








t yt = dt(Bt +Ct)Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1−dtAtXt +(1−dt +dtDt)yo
t . (B.21)
Finally, by substituting (B.13) into (B.20), one obtains the recursive formula for the bank’s
33estimate of ˜ π−1 as
Ec
t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1 = dt
 
Ec







Having derived the bank’s ﬁltering, next we substitute the results of the bank’s ﬁltering into
the equilibrium relation, namely, equation (B.12). For this purpose, let us ﬁrst discuss what
information is revealed to the agents when the equilibrium takes the form given by equation
(B.13). Equation (B.21) implies that the agents can identify Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1. This is because Xt, yo
t
and Ec
t yt are directly observable.25 Then, when equilibrium is given by (B.13), output yt is
revealed to the agents. Therefore Ei
tyt = yt. This is because Xt, yo
t and Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1 are observable
to the agents and we assume that the initial perceived inﬂation target ˜ π−1 is identical and this
fact is common knowledge (thus ˜ π−1 is observable to the agents). However, ¯ π is not revealed
because Xt (equation (B.11)), Ec
t−1 ˜ π−1 (whose evolution is given by equation (B.20)), yt and yo
t
do not contain information that allows the agents to identify ¯ π. Given the information revealed
to agents, we are now ready to rewrite equation (B.12). Regarding the second term of equation
(B.12), Ei
tEc
t+1 ˜ π−1, equation (B.22) implies that
Ei
tEc
t+1 ˜ π−1 = dt+1Ec
t ˜ π−1+(1−dt+1)˜ π−1. (B.23)
Here we used the fact that yt and yo
t are i.i.d. with zero mean. Next we compute the third term
of equation (B.12), Ei
tEc
t+1∆yt+1. Since Vt+1 is observable to the bank at time t +1, we have
Vt+1 = Ec
t+1Vt+1. Then, equation (B.14) implies














25It is assumed that Ec
t yt is announced by the bank (Section 2.3).
34Similarly, since Ec

















t of both sides, Ei
tEc







t+1 ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1

−yt. (B.24)
































By comparing our guess (B.13) and (B.25), we have the following four identities:




Bt = at −(Bt+1−Bt +φ−1at+1)dt+1, (B.27)











By substituting (B.18), equations (B.28) and (B.19) represent a system of deterministic differ-
26Notice that Ei
t∆yt+1 = −yt since yt is revealed to agents.
35ence equation with respect to Bt and τc
t















t is given by equation (B.19). Once Bt and τc
t are solved, dt is solved by (B.18). Then
equations (B.27), (B.29) and (B.29) respectively determine At, Ct and Dt. For simulation in
Section 5, we solve for Bt numerically.
Equation (B.19) and (B.30) show that Bt depends both on Bt−1 and Bt+1. Dependence
on Bt−1 results from the recursive nature of ﬁltering. Dependence on Bt+1 results from the
interaction between forward-looking nature of inﬂation and the bank’s ﬁltering. In our model,
the current equilibrium variables depend on the agents’ expectations about the future monetary
policy. The future monetary policy in turn depends on how the central bank will estimate the
future state of the economy. This is represented in equation (B.24). Therefore, the way the bank
will estimate the state of the economy in the next period will affect the current equilibrium. As
a result, the bank’s ﬁltering in the current period is affected by its ﬁltering in the future periods.
The existing literature such as Aoki (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003) focuses on
stationary ﬁltering by central bank, so that the Kalman gain is constant over time. In our
model, since the bank’s learning is about a constant ˜ π−1, ﬁltering is not stationary. That is
the main reason why dt and Bt, which are related to the Bank’s Kalman gain, is not constant
over time. In forward looking models like ours, the current equilibrium depends on agents’
expectations about the future Kalman gain of the bank. Therefore current Kalman gain also
depends on expectations about the future Kalman gain.
Let us ﬁnish this section by characterizing the stochastic properties of the central-bank
uncertainty. From equations (B.13), (B.20) and (B.28), the evolution of Ec
t ˜ π−1 is given by
Ec
t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1 = dt
 
Ec







36By using (B.8) and (B.31), and noticing that at/at−1 = bt, one obtains
Ec
t ˜ πt − ˜ πt = btdt
 
Ec







This is equation (49). As discussed in Section 4.2, there is a close relationship between the
bank’s estimates of the perceived inﬂation target and the estimates of the natural rate. Taking
the conditional expectation Ec
t of equation (B.14) and subtracting that conditional expectation




t = −Bt (Ec
t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1). (B.33)
Using (B.33) and (B.8), and by noticing that εo
t = yo
t −yt, we can see that
Ec




t yt −yt), (B.34)
which is equation (51). By substituting (51) into (B.32), we obtain the evolution of the bank’s
estimate of yt, which is (50).
Finally, we can compute the evolution of Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt in equation (52). Again, from equa-
tion (B.14) at time t and t −1 we can obtain
Ec
t yt −yt = Bt(Ec
t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1),
Ec
t yt−1−yt−1 = Bt−1(Ec
t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1).
From these equations and equation (B.8),
Ec
t ∆yt −∆yt = (Bt −Bt−1)(Ec





t ˜ πt − ˜ πt). (B.35)
Substituting (B.35) into (B.32), we obtain
Ec









37B.3 Proof of equations (42)and (43)
We show that, conditional on the information revealed in equilibrium under the imperfect two-
way communication, equation (42) and (43) holds.
Proof of equation (42) Note that equilibrium satisﬁes (B.22) and (B.24). For s = 1, (B.22)




t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1)−yt.
(Note that Ec
t ˜ π−1 and yt are revealed to agents in equilibrium.) By taking Ec






t yt = Ec
t ∆yt+1. (B.37)

















t+s−1 ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1

.
Then, by taking Ec


















t ˜ π−1 = 0. (B.39)
Since we assume that yt is i.i.d. with mean zero, equation (B.22) implies
Ei
tEc




t ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1

. (B.40)
38Notice that in equation (B.40), Ei
tEc
t ˜ π−1 = Ec
t ˜ π−1. This is because Ec
t ˜ π−1 is revealed in equi-
librium. By taking Ec





t+s∆yt+s = 0 = Ec
t ∆yt+s, s ≥ 2.
Proof of equation (43) Since Ec





t yt+s, s ≥ 0. (B.41)
For s=0, equation (B.41) holds because Ei
tEc
t yt =Ec
t yt (see Section 2.3). Notice that Ec
t yt+s =
0 for s ≥ 1. Therefore, in order to prove (B.41) we need to show that Ec
t Ei
tEc
t+syt+s = 0 for






tXt+s, s ≥ 1. (B.42)







t+s−1 ˜ π−1− ˜ π−1

, s ≥ 1. (B.43)
Since equation (B.39) holds, by taking Ec
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